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A PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE WASHINGTON’S RULES ON
EX PARTE CONTACT
Connor Rowinski*
Abstract: Privilege doctrines play an important role in allowing clients to confide in their
trusted attorneys and doctors. The intersection of two privilege doctrines in medical
malpractice litigation—physician-patient privilege and attorney-client privilege—places
physicians working at corporate hospitals in a catch-22 of allegiances. On one hand, physicians
cannot disclose patient information, whereas on the other, they must assist their employer in
defending the case. These concerns are heightened when attorneys seek to communicate with
non-party physicians ex parte—that is, unsupervised. In Youngs v. Peacehealth, the
Washington State Supreme Court allowed corporate defendants to communicate ex parte with
the plaintiff’s treating physician under the veil of attorney-client privilege. The Youngs
standard is relatively ambiguous on the scope of acceptable communication, however. This
leaves patients at risk of having their privileged information inadvertently disclosed and
physicians at risk for accidentally doing so. It also potentially provides unfair litigation
advantages to corporate defendants. To help solve these issues, this Comment offers
modifications to the Washington State Civil Rules that (1) require parties to conduct a
Rule 26(f) discovery conference before engaging in ex parte communications with non-party
treating physicians; and (2) require defendants to submit a motion to the Superior Court
explaining why the ex parte communications are necessary to their discovery process.

INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenario.1 A patient checks into a major
Washington hospital to receive knee surgery and their physicians collect an
extensive medical record. Blood diagnostics reveal they may be at risk for
a future heart condition. Their surgical team includes Doctors A, B, C, and
D. Following the surgery, the patient develops sepsis and loses both of their
legs. The plaintiff sues for medical malpractice, naming Doctor A and the
corporate hospital as parties. By filing the suit, the plaintiff waives the
confidentiality of limited information2 that is related to their injury. As the
case proceeds into discovery, the hospital’s counsel deposes Doctor A. The
hospital’s counsel also requests to interview Doctors B, C, and D without

*

J.D., Class of 2020, University of Washington School of Law. The author is grateful to King
County Superior Court Judge Suzanne Parisien, Professor William Bailey, and the Washington Law
Review staff for their valuable contributions.
1. The facts of this hypothetical are largely borrowed from Youngs v. Peacehealth, 179 Wash. 2d
645, 316 P.3d 1035 (2014).
2. See infra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
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the plaintiff’s counsel present, arguing that these interviews are necessary
for them to collect information to defend the lawsuit. The plaintiff’s counsel
files a motion to object, arguing that these interviews should only take place
in a deposition, since the patient’s confidential information might be
inadvertently disclosed. How does the trial court rule?
Under Washington law, the trial court must rule for the hospital’s
counsel, and allow them to interview Doctors B, C, and D about “the facts
of the alleged negligent incident.”3 Those doctors each state that the
plaintiff’s injury was not caused by a breach in the standard of care. After
interviewing those doctors, the hospital’s counsel incorporates their
testimony into a motion for summary judgment and secures a dismissal of
the plaintiff’s case.
The Youngs v. Peacehealth4 standard is problematic for several
reasons. First, physicians and counsel alike are required to guess where to
draw the line as to what information is permissible to disclose.5 Second,
physicians may be exposed to liability for inadvertently exposing
confidential patient information.6 Third, without the presence of opposing
counsel to regulate the flow of information, defense counsel may gain an
unfair advantage by manipulating a physician’s testimony.7
This Comment provides several approaches to solve these problems. It
begins by offering amendments to the Washington State Local Civil Rules
that require parties to conduct a Rule 26(f) discovery conference before
engaging in ex parte communications with a nonparty treating physician.
Next, should the party still seek to interview the physician ex parte, this
Comment proposes that defendants should be required to submit a motion
to the superior court explaining why the ex parte communications are
necessary for discovery. These proposals expand the procedures used to
evaluate whether parties can communicate ex parte with a nonparty
treating physician.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of
medical malpractice litigation in Washington State. Part II discusses the
two competing privilege doctrines—physician-patient confidentiality and
attorney-client privilege—and sets forth their legal foundations in
Washington law. Part III explores the intersection of these doctrines and
summarizes arguments both for and against ex parte contact with treating
physicians. Part IV sets forth a solution to the issues described.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Youngs, 179 Wash. 2d at 664, 316 P.3d at 1045.
179 Wash. 2d 645, 316 P.3d 1035 (2014).
See id. at 673–74, 316 P.3d at 1049 (Stephens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id.
See id.
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THE CONTEXT: EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS IN
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION

Medical malpractice cases form an important part of the civil docket in
Washington state courts.8 In 2015, twenty-nine medical malpractice
claims were filed per 100,000 Washington residents.9 Between 2012 and
2016, Washington plaintiffs secured over $312.9 million in total
compensation by filing these claims.10 In turn, significant costs were
placed on insurers, which are passed onto consumers via increased
insurance costs.11
In Washington, medical malpractice claims typically take three forms:
(1) professional negligence; (2) breach of warranty; or (3) failure to obtain
informed consent.12 These claims require the plaintiff to establish the
traditional elements of negligence—duty, breach, causation, and
damages13—albeit at an elevated level of technical expertise due to the
suit’s underlying subject matter.14 Washington also recognizes the doctrine
of corporate negligence in medical malpractice claims.15 This doctrine is
increasingly important, given that many patients in Washington receive
healthcare at incorporated hospitals.16 If a patient is suing for medical
8. See, e.g., Roger Stark, The Cost of Medical Malpractice Lawsuits in Washington State—Lessons
from Texas Reform, WASH. POL’Y CTR. (April 11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpolicy.org/public
ations/detail/the-cost-of-medical-malpractice-lawsuits-in-washington-state-lessons-from-texasreform [https://perma.cc/G2LW-PTTV] (summarizing, across the past several decades, three waves
of medical malpractice crises in Washington state).
9. Laura Dyrda, A State-by-State Breakdown of Medical Malpractice Suits, BECKER’S HOSP. REV.
(Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-physician-relationships/a-state-bystate-breakdown-of-medical-malpractice-suits.html [https://perma.cc/XK4G-A3E3]; see also CIVIL
JUSTICE
RES.
GRP.,
MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE
BY
THE
NUMBERS
(2019),
https://centerjd.org/cjrg/Numbers.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MGK-WYPV] (reporting that 0.8% to 1%
of all hospital patients “become victims of” medical malpractice); The Critical Role of a Medical
Expert Witness in a Medical Malpractice Case, HG EXPERTS, https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/thecritical-role-of-a-medical-expert-witness-in-a-medical-malpractice-case-41400
[https://perma.cc/5GB5-CFDZ] [hereinafter HG EXPERTS] (“[A]bout 12 million adults that have
sought treatment in the United States have been misdiagnosed each year.”).
10. MIKE KREIDLER, OFFICE OF THE INS. COMM’R FOR WASH. STATE, 2017 MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2017), https://www.insurance.wa.gov/sites/default/files/tdocu
ments/2017-med-mal-annual-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9TU-FX9N].
11. See Stark, supra note 8.
12. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.030 (2019) (outlining medical malpractice claims).
13. See Paetsch v. Spokane Dermatology Clinic, 182 Wash. 2d 842, 850, 348 P.3d 389, 393 (2015).
14. Coulter Boeschen, Medical Malpractice: Using Expert Witnesses, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/medical-malpractice-using-expert-witnesses-30087.html
[https://perma.cc/Z4V2-2L28].
15. See Lowy v. PeaceHealth, 159 Wash. App. 715, 717, 247 P.3d 7, 8 (2011).
16. See Youngs v. Peacehealth, 179 Wash. 2d 645, 680, 316 P.3d 1035, 1060 (2014) (Stephens, J.
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malpractice, it is now standard procedure for the patient to name both the
treating physicians and the corporate hospital as defendants.17
A.

Pre-trial case development in medical malpractice litigation

Medical malpractice suits often settle in negotiations before trial.18
These suits are technically complex and usually require expert
testimony.19 Therefore, discovery plays an immensely important role in
allowing both plaintiffs and defendants to seek out relevant information
and to develop their cases.20 Oftentimes, a favorable outcome in a medical
malpractice claim is contingent upon the counsel’s effectiveness in
conducting robust discovery.21
Washington attorneys employ a mix of both formal and informal
discovery tools,22 with the Washington Superior Court Local Civil Rules
(LCRs) guiding the formal discovery process.23 In the medical
malpractice context, the three primary methods of formal discovery
include depositions, interrogatories, and requests for production.24
Depositions are particularly important—for example, nearly 80% of
treating physicians report being deposed in malpractice suits, and
depending on what information the deposed reveals, “the deposition has
the potential to make or break a medical malpractice case.”25
Informal methods of discovery are also important.26 These methods can
include witness interviews, accessing government records, and internet
dissenting) (noting how “many plaintiff-patients have no realistic opportunity to arrange for their
health care outside the corporate setting”).
17. See, e.g., id. at 645, 316 P.3d at 1035 (naming both physicians and the hospital in the suit);
Lowy, 159 Wash. App. at 715, 247 P.3d at 7 (same).
18. See, e.g., The Trial Process in a Medical Malpractice Lawsuit, ALLLAW,
https://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/medical-malpractice/trial-process-lawsuit.html
[https://perma.cc/C9VG-U2QD] (reporting how, on average, 93% of medical malpractice claims are
resolved before trial).
19. See id.
20. See Discovery Techniques in Medical Malpractice Cases, CROTHER L. FIRM, https://www.clflaw.com/Medical-Malpractice-Newsroom/Discovery-Techniques-in-Medical-MalpracticeCases.shtml [https://perma.cc/W9Q3-2DSQ].
21. See HG EXPERTS, supra note 9, at 1.
22. Gerald Williams, Formal Discovery Versus Informal Discovery, WILLIAMS DIVORCE AND
FAMILY
LAW
(2007),
https://divorcelawyermn.com/2007/11/25/formal-discover/
[https://perma.cc/ZBQ8-9NU8].
23. See WASH. R. CIV. P 26.
24. See Discovery Techniques in Medical Malpractice Cases, supra note 20.
25. See id.
26. See Amy E. Morgan, Informal Discovery: Simple Strategies for Cost-Effective Litigation, 18
TRIALS & TRIBULATIONS (DRI, Apr. 23, 2012), https://www.polsinelli.com/-/media/files/articles-by-
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searches.27 Informal discovery is beneficial to litigants for at least three
reasons: (1) it is more cost-effective than formal discovery; (2) it need not
be conducted along formal discovery timelines; and (3) it can reveal
“smoking-gun” evidence at an early stage.28 And since plaintiffs’
attorneys often operate on contingency-fee arrangements, the calculation
of the costs required to bring the suit versus the amount of potential
damages weighs heavily on whether an injured patient can find an
attorney willing to litigate their claims.29
While not required in Washington, superior court judges may order the
parties to participate in a discovery conference.30 Alternatively, the parties
may independently decide to participate.31 Parties engaging in the
discovery conference will draft a discovery plan, including: (1) a
statement of the issues; (2) a plan and schedule of discovery; (3) any
limitations proposed to be placed on the discovery; (4) any other proposed
orders regarding the discovery; and (5) other matters.32 Then, following
the conference, the court will issue an order identifying the “discovery
purposes, establishing a plan and schedule for discovery, setting
limitations on discovery, if any, and determining such other matters,
including the allocation of expenses, as are necessary for the proper
management of discovery in the action.”33
Discovery conferences are viewed as valuable opportunities to
streamline discovery and forestall costly discovery disputes.34 In
particular, counsel can discuss concerns including preserving documents,
collecting and producing data, and discussing work product, physicianpatient, and attorney-client privilege limitations.35 These investments
attorneys/morgan_april_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/XE8G-NQ95].
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
669, 670 n.2, 679–80 (1986).
30. See WASH. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (“At any time after commencement of an action the court may direct
the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a conference on the subject of discovery.”).
31. See id.
32. See id. § 26(f)(1)–(5).
33. See id.
34. Helen Geib, How to Use a Rule 26(f) Conference to Cut Discovery Costs and Disputes, L.
TECH. TODAY (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.lawtechnologytoday.org/2015/02/use-rule-26fconference-cut-discovery-costs-disputes/ [https://perma.cc/6T8U-KD92].
35. See Steven D. Ginsburg, Tips on Meet-and-Confer Conferences, A.B.A. (Feb. 28, 2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/pretrial-practicediscovery/practice/2017/tips-on-meet-and-confer-conferences/
[https://perma.cc/KM69-BTES]
(“Resolving issues either because counsel recognize that the court would order it if litigated, or to
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prior to discovery yield later benefits by reducing discovery motions and
judicial intervention.36 The parties do not have to reach a consensus; as
long as the parties “take defensible positions, communicate those
positions, and listen to what each other has to say, they have done
everything that the discovery rules require.”37
B.

Ex Parte Communications are a Valuable Discovery Tool

Ex parte communications with nonparty witnesses are informal
interviews where the rules of discovery do not apply. 38 Attorneys use
these interviews to assess whether witnesses have sufficiently valuable
information to warrant a deposition or to build their knowledge of the facts
underlying the case.39 These interviews are a useful tool, given that they
can be “more efficient and cost effective in obtaining information than a
deposition because no costly court reporter is present and no opposing
counsel interrupts . . . questions with objections.”40 Witness statements
from these informal interviews can then be introduced into evidence via a
declaration attached to a motion.41
However, ethics guidelines and privilege doctrines limit the availability
and scope of ex parte communications. The Washington Rules of
Professional Conduct state that “a lawyer shall not communicate about the
subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the
expedite and economize the discovery process, are goals worth considering.”); Matt Bryant, Making
Your Rule 25(f) Meet and Confer an Effective Mechanism for Focusing Discovery and Mitigating
Discovery Costs, OHRENSTEIN & BROWN (Oct. 17, 2017), http://www.oandb.com/making-your-rule26f-meet-and-confer-an-effective-mechanism-for-focusing-discovery-and-mitigating-discoverycosts/ [https://perma.cc/4JQM-TAD9].
36. See Steven S. Gensler, Bull’s Eye View of Cooperation in Discovery, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 363,
368 (2009) (noting that discovery conferences “ensure that the parties only present ‘real’ discovery
disputes to the judge, not sloppy misunderstandings or uninformed stonewalling”); Ginsburg, supra
note 35 (“Attorneys can resolve issues . . . at the onset of a matter and minimize the need for judicial
intervention.”).
37. See Ginsburg, supra note 35.
38. See John Jennings, Physician-Patient Relationship: The Permissibility of Ex Parte
Communications Between Plaintiff’s Treating Physicians and Defense Counsel, 59 MO. L. REV. 441,
459 n.101 (1994).
39. See id.
40. See Morgan, supra note 26; see also CJB LAW, CONDUCTING EX PARTE INTERVIEWS 1 (2019),
http://www.lawcjb.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Ex-Parte.pdf [https://perma.cc/2L74-6QZZ]
(“[I]nformal ex parte interviews remain the hallmark of efficient trial preparation.”).
41. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.72.085 (2019) (“Whenever . . . any matter in an official
proceeding is required or permitted to be supported . . . the matter may with like force and effect be
supported . . . by an unsworn written statement . . .”).
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consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court
order.”42 That is, lawyers can engage in communication informally with a
witness unless the witness is represented by opposing counsel (for
instance, if the witness is a party to the suit).43
Applying these rules to a hypothetical medical malpractice suit, the
plaintiff or defendant is allowed to communicate ex parte with any of the
plaintiff’s treating physicians not named in the lawsuit. The parties may
only communicate with a treating physician named in the suit when
opposing counsel is present. But the scenario is further complicated—and
constrained—by the privilege doctrines of physician-patient
confidentiality and attorney-client privilege.
II.

COMPETING PHYSICIAN-PATIENT AND ATTORNEYCLIENT PRIVILEGES AND DUTIES IN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION

Privilege doctrines regulate the flow of information in a lawsuit. These
doctrines protect the content of a confidential communication made in the
course of a privileged relationship.44 They are often narrowly construed, since
they contradict the fundamental evidentiary principle that “the public . . . has
a right to every [person’s] evidence.”45 Two such doctrines are explored
below: the physician-patient privilege and the attorney-client privilege.
A.

The Physician-Patient Privilege Doctrine

Physician-patient privilege protects a patient’s information from being
disclosed to third parties and ensures that a patient’s communications with

42. WASH. R. PROF’L CONDUCT § 4.2; see also JOHN K. VILLA, EX PARTE INTERVIEWS WITH
CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES 124, 128 n.6 (2007), https://www.wc.com/portalresource/look
up/poid/Z1tOl9NPluKPtDNIqLMRVPMQiLsSwa3Dm0!/document.name=/Line%20308_PUBLIC
ATION%20%20Ex%20Parte%20Interviews%20with%20Current%20and%20Former%20Employe
es.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2Q3-TPLG] (internal citations omitted); see also Ex Parte, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Done or made at the instance and for the benefit of one party only,
and without notice to, or argument by, anyone having an adverse interest; of, relating to, or involving
court action taken or received by one party without notice to the other . . . .”).
43. See WASH R. PROF’L CONDUCT § 4.2; see also WASH. R. CIV. P. 17 (defining a “party”).
44. See generally THOMAS E. SPAHN, MCGUIRE WOODS LLP, A PRACTITIONER’S SUMMARY
GUIDE TO THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE (2013),
https://media.mcguirewoods.com/publications/Practitioners-Summary-Guide-Attorney-ClientPrivilege.pdf [https://perma.cc/WF2A-3L3D].
45. See Daniel W. Shuman, The Origins of the Physician-Patient Privilege and Professional Secret,
39 SW. L.J. 661, 663 n.7 (1985) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50–51 (1980))
(discussing past prohibitions on collecting privileged information).
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their doctor cannot be used against the patient in most legal proceedings.46
This privilege is an increasingly important aspect of the modern
healthcare system.47
All states afford their citizens with at least some form of privilege that
prevents third parties from accessing or disclosing confidential
information shared with their physicians.48 Both the Washington State
Legislature and Washington courts have helped construct the state’s
physician-patient privilege doctrine. RCW 5.60.060(4) states “a
physician . . . shall not, without consent of his or her patient, be examined
in a civil action as to any information acquired in attending such patient,
which was necessary to enable him or her to prescribe or act for the
patient.”49 Two important exceptions limit RCW 5.60.060(4). First,
judicial proceedings regarding a child’s injury, neglect, or sexual abuse or
the cause thereof are exempted—meaning physician-patient
confidentiality is waived per se.50 Second, a plaintiff-patient waives this
privilege ninety days after filing an action for personal injuries or
wrongful death.51 But waiving this privilege does not resolve the inquiry,
46. See What is Physician-Patient Privilege and Why is it Important?, HG LEGAL RES.,
www.hg.org/legal-articles/what-is-physician-patient-privilege-and-why-is-it-important-31873
[https://perma.cc/4W27-A59R?type=image]; see also Jennings, supra note 38, at 447–48 n.40 (“No
person duly authorized to practice physic or surgery, shall be compelled to disclose any information
which he may have acquired in attending any patient, in a professional character, and which
information was necessary to enable him to prescribe for such patient as a physician, or to do any act
for him, as a surgeon.”); Frank A. Riddick, The Code of Medical Ethics of the American Medical
Association, 5 OCHSNER J. 1, 10 (2003) (noting that physicians are required to “protect the privacy
and confidentiality of those for whom [they] care”).
47. Gerald L. Higgins, The History of Confidentiality in Medicine: The Physician-Patient
Relationship, 35 CAN. FAM. PHYSICIAN 1 (1989), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC2280818/pdf/canfamphys00158-0229.pdf [https://perma.cc/VM9M-9H7R] (“Confidentiality of
medical information is so important to the doctor-patient relationship that it is now regarded as the
norm for physicians.”).
48. Joseph Regalia & Andrew Cass, Navigating the Law of Defense Counsel Ex Parte Interviews
of Treating Physicians, 31 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 35, 43 n.52 (2015) (discussing how all
but six state legislatures have introduced physician-patient privilege statutes). On the federal level,
there may be other protections, but that is a topic beyond the scope of this Comment.
49. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(4)(a) (2019); see also Carson v. Fine, 123 Wash. 2d 206, 212,
867 P.2d 610 (1994) (noting two purposes of the statute are to: (1) “surround patient-physician
communications with a ‘cloak of confidentiality’ to promote proper treatment by facilitating full
disclosure of information”; and (2) “protect the patient from embarrassment or scandal which may
result from revelation of intimate details of medical treatment”).
50. See WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(4)(a).
51. See id. § 5.60.060(4)(b) (“Ninety days after filing an action for personal injuries or wrongful
death, the claimant shall be deemed to waive the physician-patient privilege. Waiver of the physicianpatient privilege for any one physician or condition constitutes a waiver of the privilege as to all
physicians or conditions, subject to such limitations as a court may impose pursuant to court rules”.).
The Washington State Legislature added this exception via two amendments in 1986 and 1987. See id.
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since issues then arise surrounding the scope of the subject matter waived.
For example, an opposing counsel might probe into a patient’s medical
affairs in an ex parte interview or deposition with their treating physician,
thus triggering the issue of whether the information was “necessary to
enable him or her to prescribe or act for the patient.”52
Several other modifications to the statute are relevant. First,
Washington courts interpret RCW 5.60.060 as a procedural safeguard and
not as a substantive or constitutional right.53 Second, for the purposes of
this statute, “physician” encompasses physicians, surgeons, and
osteopathic physicians and surgeons.54 However, Washington courts have
interpreted “physician” rather narrowly—as opposed to including other
medical professionals within this definition—since other sections of the
RCW categorically include various medical professionals within the
privilege doctrine, such as nurses.55 Third, the Washington State Supreme
Court held that the waiver doctrine applies to physician-witnesses of both
fact and opinion.56 Fourth, once a patient’s privilege is waived, the
treating physician has an “independent duty to testify honestly and
truthfully in a court of law, be it in favor of the plaintiff or the defense
[regarding the patient’s information].”57
While Washington courts have narrowly construed certain aspects of
RCW 5.60.060, they have broadly defined the scope of a physician’s
permissible testimony regarding treatment administered to a patient.58 For
52. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(4)(a).
53. See Carson, 123 Wash. 2d at 212, 867 P.2d at 610 (“The [physician-patient] privilege is a
creature of statute, and thus is a procedural safeguard and not a rule of substantive or constitutional
law.”) (citing Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Latta, 92 Wash. 2d 812, 819, 601 P.2d 520 (1979)).
54. See State v. Ross, 89 Wash. App. 302, 307, 947 P.2d 1290, 1292 (1997).
55. See id. at 307, 947 P.2d at 1293; see, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 5.62.020 (“No registered nurse
providing primary care or practicing under protocols, whether or not the physical presence or direct
supervision of a physician is required, may be examined in a civil or criminal action as to any
information acquired in attending a patient in the registered nurse’s professional capacity, if the
information was necessary to enable the registered nurse to act in that capacity for the patient . . .”);
id. § 18.53.200 (holding the same for optometrists); id. § 18.83.110 (psychologists); § 5.60.060(6)
(certain social workers, therapists, and other counselors). While interesting issues might arise when
applying the issues addressed in this Comment to health professionals beyond physicians, these
questions are beyond its scope.
56. See Carson, 123 Wash. 2d at 216, 867 P.2d at 616 (“We conclude that a plaintiff’s waiver of
the physician-patient privilege extends to all knowledge possessed by the plaintiff’s doctors, be it fact
or opinion.”).
57. See Christensen v. Munsen, 123 Wash. 2d 234, 239, 867 P.2d 626, 629 (1994) (citing Carson,
123 Wash. 2d at 218–19, 867 P.2d at 618).
58. Ross, 89 Wash. App. at 302, 947 P.2d at 1292; see also Randa v. Bear, 50 Wash. 2d 415, 420–
21, 312 P.2d 640, 644 (1957) (“[P]rivilege applies to all information acquired by physician for
purpose of enabling him to treat patient, including that which he learns from observation as well as
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instance, the physician is permitted to describe the nature and the extent
of examination they made while the patient was under their care.59 This
can include oral communications,60 hospital records,61 or other types of
data such as the results of a urinalysis test.62 Furthermore, patient
information is not confidential if the opposing counsel can show that the
matter was also disclosed to a non-physician third party.63 For instance,
Smith v. Orthopedics International64 involved a patient who underwent
heart surgery and developed a bacterial infection that ultimately caused
her death.65 During discovery, the hospital’s defense counsel transmitted
public records (including the plaintiff’s expert testimony) to the treating
physician, who was called as a fact-witness for the defense.66 The court
held that since the records were effectively public information, there was
no violation of the physician-patient confidentiality rule.67
Even in light of these guidelines, each medical malpractice case
presents a unique challenge in assessing what exact information is
privileged.68 Further, these challenges are heightened given that most
physicians are not aware of the contours of the law.69
B.

The Policy Concerns of Releasing a Patient’s Privileged Medical
Information

Maintaining the physician-patient privilege is becoming increasingly
more important. Advances in information technology now allow
physicians to keep detailed electronic records about their patients.70 These
records can include demographic, financial, personal, and social
through communication with him. [It] also extends to X-ray photographs made at physician’s
direction and to hospital records containing information supplied by him.”).
59. See Strafford v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. 95 Wash. 450, 164 P. 71 (1917).
60. See State v. Mines, 35 Wash. App. 932, 671 P.2d 273 (1983).
61. See id.
62. See State v. Rochelle, 11 Wash. App. 887, 527 P.2d 87 (1974).
63. See State v. Broussard, 12 Wash. App. 355, 529 P.2d 1128 (1974).
64. 149 Wash. App. 337, 340, 203 P.3d 1066, 1067 (2009).
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 343, 203 P.3d at 1069.
68. See Loudon v. Mhyre, 110 Wash. 2d 675, 756 P.2d 138 (1988).
69. See Youngs v. Peacehealth, 179 Wash. 2d 645, 67980, 316 P.3d 1035, 1052 (Stephens, J.
dissenting) (citing Loudon, 110 Wash. 2d at 678, 756 P.2d 138 (admitting that from a physician’s
perspective, “[w]e are concerned . . . with the difficulty of determining whether a particular piece of
information is relevant”)).
70. See generally Amarra Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN APPLIED
ETHICS 266 (Andrew I. Cohen & Christopher H. Wellman eds., 2005).
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information such as sexual orientation and addictions, as well as
traditional medical information including diagnoses, treatments, and
family medical histories.71 Genetic information is of particular
importance, in part driven by the advances of the Human Genome
Project.72 Genetic testing now allows physicians to predict an individual’s
propensity for future illnesses and behaviors, thus revealing
“sensitive . . . unique and immutable attributes . . . not just personal, but
shared by family members as well.”73
In the course of litigation, medical records are brought before the court
as evidence. When the case ends, this data must be carefully disposed of
to avoid inadvertent disclosure; however, patient data is often leaked to
the public.74 In fact, such data is viewed as a valuable commodity. 75 As
the availability of information has increased, so has the number of third
parties seeking to exploit such information.76 Physician-patient privilege
is an increasingly important aspect of the both the healthcare and legal
systems and patients have valid cause for concern should their private
information be disclosed.
C.

Attorney-client privilege in corporate medicine

Attorney-client privilege is another important privilege embedded in
the American judicial system.77 Washington primarily uses a statutory
71. Ralph Ruebner & Leslie A. Reis, Hippocrates to HIPAA: A Foundation for a Federal PhysicianPatient Privilege, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 505, 521 (2004).
72. See An Overview of the Human Genome Project, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST. (Oct. 28,
2018), https://www.genome.gov/human-genome-project/What [https://perma.cc/BM3X-JXB3]. The
Human Genome Project determined “the order, or ‘sequence,’ of all the bases in our genome’s DNA;
ma[de] maps that show the locations of genes for major sections of all our chromosomes; and
produc[ed] what are called linkage maps, through which inherited traits (such as those for genetic
disease) can be tracked over generations.” Id.
73. Joanne L. Hustead & Janlori Goldman, Genetics and Privacy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 285 (2002).
74. TERESA D. LOCKE, HOLLAND & HART, MEDICAL RECORDS ISSUES: CONTENT, MAINTENANCE,
AND RETENTION 87 (2016), https://www.hollandhart.com/pdf/DHCP_medical_records_webinar.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8DJA-7SZ3].
75. Using Medical Malpractice Litigation for Healthcare Analytics, HEALTH IT ANALYTICS (Sep.
23, 2014), https://healthitanalytics.com/news/using-medical-malpractice-litigation-for-healthcareanalytics [https://perma.cc/U5JC-BVWZ].
76. See, e.g., Richard Harris, If Your Medical Information Becomes A Moneymaker, Could You Get
A Cut?, NPR (Oct. 15, 2018, 4:45 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2018/10/15/657493767/if-your-medical-information-becomes-a-moneymaker-could-youcould-get-a-cut [https://perma.cc/8LU2-X6CF] (“Hospitals and health plans are increasingly using
the huge amount of medical data they collect for research. It’s a business worth billions of dollars,
and sometimes those discoveries can be the foundation of new profit-making products and
companies.”).
77. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF.
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approach to govern attorney-client privilege.78 RCW 5.60.060(2) states
that “[a]n attorney shall not, without the consent of his or her client, be
examined as to any communication made by the client to him or her, or
his or her advice given thereon in the course of professional
employment.”79 This privilege is twofold: first, it allows communications
between a client and their attorney to be confidential; and second, it
ensures that attorneys can maintain an open line of communication with
their clients.80 Otherwise, attorneys might be unable to comply with their
duties to be effective advocates for their client.81
In Upjohn v. United States,82 the United States Supreme Court
discussed attorney-client privilege in the corporate context.83 However,
the Court clarified that the privilege does not attach to facts disclosed in
the communications themselves:
[T]he protection of the privilege extends only to communications
and not to facts. A fact is one thing and a communication
concerning that fact is an entirely different thing. The client
cannot be compelled to answer the question, 'What did you say or
write to the attorney?,’ but may not refuse to disclose any relevant
fact within his knowledge merely because he incorporated a
statement of such fact into his communication to his attorney.84
The Court then held that corporations may be entitled to attorney-client
privilege like any other client.85 The Court overruled precedent limiting
the privilege to counsel’s communications with the corporate “control
group”—for instance, upper-level management—and held that the
privilege can extend to communications with certain lower-level

L. REV. 1061 (1978).
78. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(2) (2019).
79. See id.
80. See Hazard, supra note 77, at 1061.
81. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (“Loyalty and
independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer’s relationship to a client.”); see also
Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (“The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice
or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being
fully informed by the client.”).
82. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
83. See id. at 384; see also Sherman v. State, 128 Wash. 2d 164, 190, 905 P.2d 355, 370 (1995)
(citing Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394–95, for the principle that “correspondence between an attorney for a
corporate entity and that entity’s employees [may be] subject to the attorney-client privilege of the
corporate entity”).
84. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395–96 (quoting Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp.
830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1962)).
85. See id. at 389–90.
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employees.86 This does not mean that all employees of a corporation are
within the ambit of attorney-client privilege. Instead, the privilege applies
to communications to certain corporate employees, where the
communications “concerned matters within the scope of the employees’
corporate duties, and the employees themselves were sufficiently aware
that they were being questioned in order that the corporation could obtain
legal advice.”87
While Upjohn opened the door for corporate attorney-client privilege,
the Court’s holding left room for lower courts to tailor the doctrine to the
specific contexts.88 The Upjohn doctrine is particularly important in the
medical malpractice context, given that most opportunities for medical
treatment are located in centralized, corporate entities.89
III. THE INTERSECTION OF PHYSICIAN-PATIENT AND
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN EX PARTE CONTACT
There is tension at the intersection of ex parte communications, patientphysician privilege, and attorney-client privilege, thus placing physicians
in contradictory positions. On one hand, they must maintain their duty of
confidentiality to their patients. On the other, they must maintain
allegiance to their employers.
A.

Arguments For and Against Allowing Ex Parte Contacts With NonParty Treating Physicians

Given the value of ex parte communication in litigating medical
malpractice cases, it is not surprising that opposing sides of the bar are
engaged in a spirited debate on the subject.90
Those against allowing defendants to use ex parte interviews with nonparty physicians tend to make the following arguments. First, since the
rules of civil procedure do not expressly allow ex parte interviews on
behalf of defense counsel, some argue that ex parte interviews should not

86. See id.
87. See id. at 394.
88. See Youngs v. Peacehealth, 179 Wash. 2d 645, 663, 316 P.3d 1035, 1044 (2014).
89. See id. at 680, 316 P.3d at 1052 (“[M]any plaintiff-patients have no realistic opportunity to
arrange for their health care outside the corporate setting . . . .”).
90. See Jennings, supra note 38, at 454–59.
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be permitted.91 Relatedly, some argue that formal discovery options are
sufficient for defendants to gather relevant medical information.92
Other courts have focused their concerns on the patient’s privileges.
For instance, the Washington State Supreme Court has cautioned that
allowing a defendant unrestricted access to treating physicians might
discourage patients from discussing health-related matters openly with
their physicians, thus undermining physician-patient privilege.93
Furthermore, the Arizona Court of Appeals has pointed out that since
physicians lack legal training, the risks of inadvertent disclosures of
sensitive, confidential information might be heightened in these
interviews.94 Lastly, some courts have recognized that ex parte
communication may allow defense counsel to unduly influence a
physician’s testimony.95 This is critical because it may provide an unfair
advantage to the hospital’s defense counsel.96
Those arguing in favor of ex parte interviews tend to make the
following arguments.97 First, they argue that allowing defense counsel to
communicate ex parte makes discovery more equitable to the parties.98
Rules of civil procedure are often required to be “construed, administered,
and employed . . . to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive

91. See King v. Ahrens, 798 F. Supp. 1371, 1373 (W.D. Ark. 1992) (discussing how courts
prohibiting ex parte defense interviews typically argue that the procedural rules discuss formal
depositions with physicians but not ex parte interviews).
92. See Horner v. Rowan Cos. Inc., 153 F.R.D. 597, 602 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (“Formal discovery, on the
record, with notice and an opportunity to other parties to be present and to participate in the proceedings, is
simply the fairest and most satisfactory means of obtaining discovery from a treating physician.”).
93. See Loudon v. Mhyre, 110 Wash. 2d 675, 679, 756 P.2d 138, 141 (noting how it is difficult to
imagine how a physician could engage in ex parte communication without endangering the truth and
faith that patients invest in physicians).
94. See Duquette v. Superior Court, 778 P.2d 634, 641 (Ariz. App. 1989) (“A physician may lack
an understanding of the legal distinction between an informal method of discovery such as an ex parte
interview, and formal methods of discovery such as depositions and interrogatories, and may therefore
feel compelled to participate in the ex parte interview.” (emphasis in original)).
95. See Youngs v. Peacehealth, 179 Wash. 2d 645, 673–74, 316 P.3d 1035, 1049 (2014) (Stephens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Smith v. Orthopedics Int’l, Ltd., 170 Wash. 2d
659, 668, 244 P.3d 939, 944 (2010) (“[T]he Loudon rule is particularly important to avoid the risk
that the plaintiff’s health care providers might be unduly ‘shaped and influenced by’ ex parte contact
or ‘improperly assume a role akin to that of an expert witness for the defense.’”)).
96. See id.
97. For a helpful discussion of these arguments and counterarguments, see Jennings, supra note 38,
at 458–59.
98. Morrison v. Brandeis Univ., 125 F.R.D. 14, 19 (D. Mass. 1989) (stating that “interviewing
witnesses without the presence of opposing counsel in order to gain information” is an “important
function[ ] which counsel traditionally play[s] in litigation”).
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determination of every action and proceeding.”99 Since ex parte
communication bypasses formalities—like the scheduling and
administrative hassles inherent in depositions—defense counsel argue
that these interviews makes their representation significantly more
efficient.100 Costs are an important aspect of medical malpractice
discovery, and ex parte communications reduce costs.101
Alternatively, in support of allowing these interviews, some courts
have held that physicians are to be treated as important fact witnesses after
the physician-patient privilege has been waived.102 That is, physicians
should be treated less like the patient’s witness and more like an objective
witness. To this end, certain courts have acknowledged that requiring
defendants to depose treating physicians gives plaintiffs a tactical
advantage by enabling them to monitor defendants’ case preparation.103
As defense counsel have noted, they will have no opportunity other than
formal discovery procedures to prepare their case if ex parte
communication is not permissible.104
Both sides of the bar have valid arguments. In some jurisdictions,
plaintiffs have prevailed and ex parte communication with non-party
treating physicians is prohibited.105 In other jurisdictions, defendants have
won out and ex parte communication is encouraged—or at least,
accepted.106 As discussed below, Washington’s approach falls in the
middle by allowing limited ex parte interviews.
B.

Washington’s Approach to Ex Parte Communications

The Washington State Legislature affords patients a right to privileged
communications with their physicians—but this privilege is waived when
the patient places their medical status at issue in the litigation.107 However,

99. FED R. CIV. P. 1; see also Regalia & Cass, supra note 48, at 54–55.
100. See Regalia & Cass, supra note 48, at 36 (“One practice that may mitigate rising costs and
save money for all parties involved is to allow ex parte interviews of treating physicians.”).
101. See id. at 53–54.
102. See Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C. 1983).
103. See Loudon v. Mhyre, 110 Wash. 2d 675, 677, 756 P.2d 138, 140 (1988).
104. See id.
105. See Benally v. United States, 216 F.R.D. 478, 480–81 (D. Ariz. 2003) (prohibiting ex parte
defense interviews because the court interpreted the physician-patient privilege to exclude interviews
as a matter of public policy).
106. See supra note 98; Samms v. District Court, 908 P.2d 520, 526 (Colo. 1995); Roberts v. Estep,
845 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Ky. 1993); Regalia & Cass supra note 48, at 54–56.
107. See supra section II.A.
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privilege is only waived to a certain extent—and the scope is narrow.108
In order to obtain this information once it has been waived, counsel can
use formal and informal discovery tools, including depositions and ex
parte interviews.109 There are three cases critical to understanding
Washington’s approach on ex parte contact: (1) Wright v. Group Health
Hospital,110 (2) Loudon v. Mhyre,111 and (3) Youngs v. Peacehealth. These
cases discuss circumstances when counsel can communicate ex parte with
a treating physician and highlight how physician-patient privilege
intersects with attorney-client privilege.
1.

Wright v. Group Health Hospital: Plaintiffs Can Conduct Ex Parte
Interviews with Nonparty Medical Staff

Wright involved the issue of whether an incorporated hospital may
prohibit its employee-physicians from participating in ex parte interviews
with the plaintiff’s counsel.112 The plaintiff sued Group Health for medical
malpractice during the plaintiff’s delivery of her son.113 The plaintiff
named both the hospital and her primary treating physician in the suit.114
During discovery, the plaintiff asked for the contact information of the
nurses involved in her care for the purposes of conducting ex parte
interviews with them.115 The trial court denied the plaintiff’s protective
order for these interviews, finding they would violate the American Bar
Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-104(A)(1),116
which prohibits an attorney from speaking with another represented party
to the litigation without consent.117
The Washington State Supreme Court reversed, allowing the plaintiff
to conduct ex parte interviews with the nurses.118 The Court held that:
(1) the attorney-client privilege would not, of itself, bar an opposing
108. See supra section II.A.
109. See supra section II.B.3.
110. 103 Wash. 2d 192, 691 P.2d 564 (1984).
111. 110 Wash. 2d 675, 756 P.2d 138 (1988).
112. Wright, 103 Wash. 2d at 193, 316 P.3d at 565.
113. See id. at 193, 316 P.3d at 565–66.
114. See id. at 197, 316 P.3d at 567.
115. See id. at 194, 316 P.3d at 566.
116. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
117. See id. (“During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not: (1)
[c]ommunicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the representation with a party he
knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer
representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so.”).
118. Wright, 103 Wash. 2d at 195, 316 P.3d at 567.
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attorney from interviewing employees of a corporation so long as the
inquiries concerned factual matters and not communications between the
employee and the corporation’s attorney119; (2) current employees
authorized to speak for a corporation would be considered “parties” with
whom opposing counsel could not speak ex parte120; and (3) opposing
counsel could interview employees of the corporation ex parte so long as
such employees were not authorized to speak for the corporation or in a
management status.121
Wright is important for two reasons. First, it affirms that physicians
working for incorporated hospitals are corporate employees. This allowed
the Washington State Supreme Court to later apply the Upjohn standard
to permit a hospital’s attorneys to communicate with its employees under
the protection of attorney-client privilege.122 Second, Wright permitted at
least some sort of ex parte contact with the treating physician—although
plaintiff’s contact is not considered inherently problematic since
plaintiff’s counsel will be able to regulate the flow of information. And,
at the very least, this bypasses some of the above arguments that ex parte
contact should be per se prohibited since it is not expressly permitted in
the rules of civil procedure.123
2.

Loudon v. Mhyre: Prohibiting Ex Parte Contacts Between the
Plaintiff’s Treating Physicians and Defense Counsel

While Wright dealt with the scope of a defendant-corporation’s
attorney-client privilege, the court did not discuss the relationship
between physician-patient privilege and ex parte contacts.124 The court
squarely addressed the physician-patient privilege issue in Loudon.125
In Loudon, the plaintiff’s estate brought medical malpractice claims
against two of the decedent’s treating physicians.126 The plaintiff had
suffered from liver and kidney damage resulting from an automobile
accident.127 After treating him for a week, the two treating physicians
119. See id. at 194–95, 316 P.3d at 566.
120. Id. at 200–01, 316 P.3d at 569.
121. Id. at 201, 316 P.3d at 570.
122. See Youngs v. Peacehealth, 179 Wash. 2d 645, 664, 316 P.3d 1035, 1045 (2014) (“Under this
rule, corporate defense counsel may have privileged ex parte communications with a plaintiff’s
nonparty treating physician . . . .”).
123. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
124. See Loudon v. Mhyre, 110 Wash. 2d 675, 681, 756 P.2d 138, 142 (1988).
125. See id. at 675, 756 P.2d at 139.
126. See id.
127. See id.
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released him.128 The plaintiff sought additional treatment from two other
health care providers before his death.129 During discovery, the plaintiff
provided defendants’ counsel with medical records from the two other
health care providers, and the defendants moved for an order allowing
ex parte communication with those physicians.130 The trial court held that
although the patients’ privilege was waived, ex parte contact was
prohibited and only formal discovery was allowable.131
The Washington State Supreme Court held that ex parte interviews
between a plaintiff’s treating physicians and the defendant’s counsel
should be prohibited as a matter of public policy.132 The Court stated:
The physician-patient privilege prohibits a physician from being
compelled to testify, without the patient’s consent, regarding
information revealed and acquired for the purpose of treatment.
A patient may waive this privilege by putting his or her physical
condition in issue. Waiver is not absolute, however, but is limited
to medical information relevant to the litigation. The danger of an
ex parte interview is that it may result in disclosure of irrelevant,
privileged medical information.133
The Court reviewed a number of cases where other jurisdictions have
similarly prohibited such communications.134 Furthermore, the court
rejected the defendant’s argument that ex parte contact should be
permitted—given that plaintiffs can use CR 26(c)135 to seek protective
orders limiting the contact to good cause—since this would require the
trial court to supervise all contact.136
With this holding, the Washington State Supreme Court appeared to bar
defense counsel from using ex parte interviews, primarily relying on the
policy rationale that a patient’s information could be inadvertently disclosed.

128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 681–82, 756 P.2d at 142.
133. Id. at 677–78, 756 P.2d at 140.
134. See id. at 677, 756 P.2d at 140 (citing Alston v. Greater S.E. Cmty. Hosp., 107 F.R.D. 35
(D.D.C. 1985); Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. P’ship v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353 (Iowa 1986); Wenninger
v. Muesing, 240 N.W.2d 333 (Minn. 1976)); Petrillo v. Syntex Labs, Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1986).
135. WASH. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
136. See Loudon, 110 Wash. 2d at 679, 756 P.2d at 141.
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The Majority’s Position in Youngs v. Peacehealth

A little over a decade later, the Washington State Supreme Court again
considered the intersection of these two privilege doctrines in Youngs v.
Peacehealth.137 This time, the court considered whether certain ex parte
communications between a hospital’s corporate defense counsel and
hospital employees may be protected by Upjohn but barred by Loudon.138
Youngs implicated this conflict between privileges and involved two
similar factual patterns consolidated before the Washington State Supreme
Court.139 The court granted certiorari to determine “whether Loudon v.
Mhyre, which prohibits defense counsel in a personal injury case from
communicating ex parte with the plaintiff’s nonparty treating physician,
applies to such physicians when they are employed by a defendant.”140
The first set of facts involved a plaintiff who was admitted to the
defendant PeaceHealth’s facility for lung surgery.141 While at the hospital,
he developed sepsis, which eventually caused the loss of both his legs and
hands.142 He sued PeaceHealth for negligent postoperative care under the
doctrines of corporate negligence, respondeat superior, res ipsa loquitor,
and for failure to obtain informed consent.143 In his complaint, the plaintiff
identified two doctors whose conduct triggered the sepsis, but he did not
name them as defendants.144 The plaintiff did not object to ex parte
contacts between PeaceHealth’s defense counsel and the two doctors, but
did object to ex parte contacts with any other physician who treated him
while at the facility.145 Ultimately, the trial court ruled for PeaceHealth,
thus allowing defense counsel ex parte contact with any PeaceHealth
employee who provided healthcare to him.146
The second set of facts involved a plaintiff who checked into the
emergency room at University of Washington’s Harborview Medical
Center (Harborview) for chest pain.147 After she checked in, she waited

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

179 Wash. 2d 645, 316 P.3d 1035 (2014).
Id. at 653, 316 P.3d at 1039.
See id. at 650, 316 P.3d at 1038.
Id. (citations omitted).
See id. at 653, 316 P.3d at 1039.
See id.
See id. at 653–54, 316 P.3d at 1039.
See id. at 654, 316 P.3d at 1039.
See id.
See id. at 654, 316 P.3d at 1040.
See id.
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over four hours for a nurse to take a blood sample.148 Her blood work
revealed significant risk of cardiac arrest, but the hospital discharged
her.149 Before she left the hospital, however, her treating physician’s
assistant realized he had looked at the wrong patients’ blood work records
and subsequently had the plaintiff transferred to the catherization room.150
Shortly after, she suffered several cardiac arrests, underwent surgery, and
was transferred in critical condition to the University of Washington
Medical Center (UW Medical Center), another facility in the University
of Washington hospital system. The plaintiff ultimately underwent a
complete heart transplant at UW Medical Center.151
The plaintiff sued Harborview for negligently delaying her transfer to
the catheterization room.152 In the course of the litigation, she did not
object to Harborview defense counsel’s contact with any of its Emergency
Department or Cardiology staff, as long as the individuals were not shown
any records of her subsequent care at the UW Medical Center.153 The trial
court issued a protective order prohibiting Harborview’s defense counsel
from contacting any of the plaintiff’s treating physicians at the UW
Medical Center.154
The Washington State Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and
transferred them to the Washington State Supreme Court for a ruling on
the ex parte issue.155 On appeal, the defendant-hospitals argued that the
corporate attorney-client privilege guaranteed their right to communicate
ex parte with any of their employees, thus overriding the Loudon rule
(which establishes a patient-plaintiff’s right to supervise his nonparty
physician’s communications with opposing counsel).156 In response, the
plaintiffs argued that, in spite of Upjohn, the Loudon rule nonetheless
protects a patient’s right to shield their nonparty treating physicians from
ex parte communications.157
The majority’s holding sought to strike an equitable balance between
the two viewpoints. First, the court held that corporate attorney-client
privilege trumps the Loudon rule where an ex parte interview enables
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See id.
See id. at 654–55, 316 P.3d at 1040.
See id. at 655, 316 P.3d at 1040.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 656, 316 P.3d at 1040.
See id.
See id. at 656–57, 316 P.3d at 1041.
See id. at 656, 316 P.3d at 1040.
See id.
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corporate counsel to “‘determine what happened’ to trigger the
litigation.”158 That is, the court clarified that Upjohn overrides Loudon
where the non-party treating physician is employed by an incorporated
hospital—since the hospital’s counsel is entitled to confer with physicians
under attorney-client privilege. However, the court limited the scope of
permissible communications, stating:
Under this rule, corporate defense counsel may have privileged
ex parte communications with a plaintiff’s nonparty treating
physician only where the communication meets the general
prerequisites to application of the attorney-client privilege, the
communication is with a physician who has direct knowledge of the
event or events triggering the litigation, and the communications
concern the facts of the alleged negligent incident.159
This rule means that an attorney hired by a corporate defendant to
investigate or litigate an alleged negligent event may engage in privileged
ex parte communications with the corporation’s physician employee,
where (1) the physician-employee has firsthand knowledge of the alleged
negligent event, and (2) the communications are limited to the facts of the
alleged negligent event.160
The court noted that this rule “strikes the proper balance between the
attorney-client and physician-patient privileges,” thus deferring Loudon’s
protections to allow corporate defense counsel the right to fully
investigate their potential liability.161 Furthermore, the majority noted that
ex parte communications could encompass both written communications
and interviews.162
4.

The Youngs Dissenting Faction Highlighted Deficiencies in this
Holding

The en banc Washington State Supreme Court was far from unified in
Youngs. Three judges joined Justice Stephen’s opinion dissenting in part
and concurring in part, which criticized the majority’s rule and urged for
the court to instead “recognize that the Loudon rule applies fully to
medical malpractice cases in which the plaintiff’s nonparty treating

158. See id. at 664–65, 316 P.3d at 1044–45 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
392 (1981)).
159. See id. at 664, 316 P.3d at 1045 (citations omitted).
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
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physicians happen to be employed by the defendant.”163
The dissent criticized the majority’s approach on several grounds. First,
Justice Stephens argued that the majority’s rule was unworkable for both
attorneys and physicians.164 She noted that, since the corporate defendant
can claim attorney-client privilege over what the plaintiff’s physician tells
the defense counsel, the physician cannot then relate that same
information to the patient.165 Therefore, she argued the rule would require
physicians to “guess . . . about where to draw the line between providing
confidential information to the employer and breaching a fiduciary duty
to the plaintiff.”166 Indeed, she framed the majority’s rule as both
ambiguous and cumbersome for the involved parties.
Second, along those same lines, Justice Stephens argued that this rule
subverts the public policy considerations set forth by the Loudon rule.167
Building off the Loudon concerns, she argued that the majority improperly
deferred to Upjohn when considering how attorney-client privilege
intersects with physician-patient privilege doctrines by “turn[ing] a case
about a corporate defendant’s right to shield from disclosure internal
employee questionnaires (Upjohn) into an entitlement to interview, ex
parte, an opposing party’s treating physician.”168 That is, she argued the
majority overextended Upjohn by improperly drawing a distinction
between being able to engage in Upjohn privileged communications and
being able to engage in unregulated ex parte communications.169
Third, Justice Stephens discussed the hypothetical situation of when
the plaintiff is also an employee-physician who suffered medical
malpractice at the hands of their hospital170 This example underscored the
163. See id. at 682, 316 P.3d at 1053 (Stephens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
164. See id. at 672, 675, 316 P.3d at 1049, 1050 (“How this rule will play out in practice is hard to
describe.”).
165. See id. at 675, 316 P.3d at 1050.
166. See id. at 682, 316 P.3d at 1053.
167. See id. at 674–75, 316 P.3d at 1049 (Stephens, J., dissenting) (“[T]his rule serves several
important goals: it safeguards the plaintiff’s confidentiality interest in not having irrelevant personal
health care information disclosed; it protects the physician-patient fiduciary relationship and serves
the physician’s interest in avoiding inadvertent disclosures that might give rise to liability to the
patient; and it serves the administration of justice, avoiding the risk that defense counsel may become
an impeachment witness. In the context of medical malpractice litigation, the Loudon rule is
particularly important to avoid the risk that the plaintiff’s health care providers might be unduly
‘shaped and influenced by’ ex parte contact or ‘improperly assume a role akin to that of an expert
witness for the defense.’” (citations omitted)).
168. See id. at 675, 316 P.3d at 1050.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 677, 316 P.3d at 1051 (recognizing how this situation “is increasingly common in
this era of large health care organizations that require employees to receive services inside their
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Court’s concern that the Upjohn extension would override physicianpatient privilege.171 Justice Stephens expressed concern that, under the
majority’s holding, “a plaintiff can do nothing but blindly trust that
opposing counsel and her physician will discuss only ‘the facts of the
alleged negligent event.’”172
Lastly, Justice Stephens expressed concern about how the majority’s
holding would fit in with another component of the statutory physicianpatient privilege regime under RCW 5.60.060(2)(a),173 which prohibits
examination of an attorney regarding attorney-client communication.174
She noted that under this statute, a plaintiff would be prohibited from
inquiring about inadvertent disclosures of privileged information given
the attorney-client privilege prohibition.175
Having summarized these concerns, the dissent urged the majority to
reconsider its significant extension of Upjohn and to instead recognize that
the Loudon rule should fully apply to medical malpractice cases where the
plaintiff’s nonparty treating physicians are employed by the defendant.176
IV. SUGGESTIONS TO RECONCILE DEFICIENCIES IN YOUNGS
While opening the door to ex parte contact for corporate defense
counsel, Youngs does not answer many of issues raised in its holding.177
These issues are both procedural and substantive. From a procedural
standpoint, the Youngs rule is ambiguous. It provides no clear system or
metric for a physician to determine what information they are permitted
to disclose.178 Further, it does not provide guidance on how its holding fits
into the litigation process. For instance, at what point can the defendant
actually interview physicians ex parte? Before, during, or even after
discovery has been concluded? This complicates the discovery process for
both litigants and trial court judges. And from a substantive standpoint, it
places the involved parties at risk of inadvertent information disclosure,
liability, and unfair advantages or disadvantages in litigation.179 This
system”).
171. See id.
172. See id. at 678–79, 316 P.3d at 1051.
173. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(2)(a) (2019).
174. See Youngs, 179 Wash. 2d at 679, 316 P.3d at 1052.
175. See id. at 678–80, 316 P.3d at 1052.
176. See id. at 682, 316 P.3d at 1053.
177. See id.; supra section III.B.4.
178. See supra section III.B.4.
179. See id. These advantages typically arise from the fact that the defense counsel can use ex parte
interviews to document a physician’s opinion, introduce that opinion into a summary judgment
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Comment seeks to remedy these concerns by proposing modifications to
the Washington State Superior Court Civil Rules.
A.

A Model Solution to Ex Parte Contact Issues in Medical
Malpractice Litigation

Legal scholars have identified at least three critical components that
should be reflected in a solution to the issues posed by ex parte
interviews.180 First, the type of authority (for instance, statutes, civil rules,
etc.) setting forth the solution must be carefully selected.181 Second, the
solution should result in definitive standards that both attorneys and
physicians can follow.182 Third, the solution should balance competing
policy concerns, including: (a) the patients’ interest in protecting their
confidential information; (b) the physicians’ interest in insulating
themselves from liability and maintaining their duty of care to their
patients; and (c) plaintiff and defense counsels’ interest in effectively
litigating the suit.183 This last interest has several variables, given that
effective litigation can encompass costs, the ability to gather information
and make informed decisions for their clients, and the ability to use certain
procedural and evidentiary tools like depositions.
The first task is determining how to implement a solution. Because ex
parte disputes are battles fought in trial courts, trial judges should play a
critical role in implementing and administering such rules.184 This
Comment therefore proposes two amendments to the Washington
Superior Court Civil Rules. It is helpful to first build on some existing
scholarship. In a case study addressing Nevada’s framework for assessing
ex parte interviews, which was regulated only by common law, the
authors proposed a model statute containing the following provisions:
One provision allows the plaintiff to seek a protective order
specifically delineating what topics the treating physician may
discuss—upon the plaintiff making a sufficient showing that there is
a “significant likelihood” of inadvertent disclosure of privileged
information. A protective order is available where plaintiff
motion via a declaration, and then to leverage a settlement. See Smith v. Orthopedics Int’l, Ltd., 170
Wash. 2d 659, 668–69, 244 P.3d 939, 944 (2010). Because the plaintiff will have had no opportunity
to object at the interview, the defense counsel can secure favorable testimony. Id.
180. See Regalia & Cass, supra note 48, at 68.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See generally id. (“[T]he optimal solution will balance the competing policy interests of the
plaintiff and defense bars, and also account for the interests of physicians.”).
184. See Jodi S. Balsam, The New Second Circuit Local Rules: Anatomy and Commentary, 19 J.L.
& POL’Y 469, 538 (2011) (discussing how local rules are effective in implementing policy solutions).
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demonstrates reasonable concerns that the treating physician may
have trouble figuring out what information she is permitted to
disclose even after the defense counsel complies with the procedural
safeguards. Our proposed solution incorporates a number of
provisions ensuring that the treating physician is informed of the
proper topics of the interview and of her option not to participate.
The statute also requires proper notice to the plaintiff so that in the
event there is a reasonable basis to restrict ex parte contact, plaintiff’s
counsel has an adequate opportunity to seek protection from the
court. One provision also requires that defense counsel memorialize
the topics that were discussed so that plaintiff’s counsel will be able
to review the interview record if needed.185
This statute functioned to balance plaintiffs’, defendants’, and physicians’
interests in regulating ex parte interviews.186 Essentially, it allowed defendants
to interview nonparty treating physicians ex parte, but allowed plaintiffs
several measures to protect their interests.187 This Comment uses this model
statute as a guide to set forth a solution to the issues posed by Youngs.
B.

Proposed Additions to Washington’s Superior Court Civil Rules

This Comment offers a two-step process that could alleviate some of
the problems posed by Youngs. First, if a party is seeking to engage in ex
parte communications with a nonparty treating physician, then the parties
should first be required to participate in a mandatory Rule 26(f)
conference to discuss the scope of the interview and other important
considerations. Second, following the conference, if the party still seeks
to engage in the communication, that party should be required to submit
a motion to the trial court. Principally, this motion should explain why ex
parte communication, instead formal discovery channels, is necessary to
gain information.
1.

First, the Parties Should Engage in a Discovery Conference

The Superior Court Civil Rules should be amended to require opposing
parties to meet and confer about their plans to communicate ex parte with
a nonparty treating physician.
Since this conference would outline any issues that might arise
throughout discovery, the parties should be required to discuss the extent

185. See Regalia & Cass, supra note 48, at 70.
186. See id.
187. See Id.
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of waived information that is relevant to the litigation, or in the Youngs
language, “the facts of the alleged negligent accident.”188 These
conferences play a valuable role in complex discovery by ensuring that
issues are addressed before sensitive information may be disclosed—
instead of afterwards.189 In particular, CR 26(f)190 could include an
amendment stating:
(f)(iii) If any party has waived their physician-patient privilege
pursuant to RCW 5.60.060 and the opposing party intends on
engaging in ex parte contact with a nonparty treating physician,
that party must disclose (1) the attorney-client relationship; (2)
the scope of the communications intended; (3) the disclosure of
any non-substantive concerns, such as scheduling and logistics;
and (4) a short description of the alleged incident that the party
seeks to discuss.
This amendment would ensure that any issues regarding the scope of
sensitive information must be brought to the courts’ attention before ex
parte interviews are conducted.
These conferences would have several benefits. Principally, the court
would be able to better monitor and regulate the scope of the communications
via protective orders since both parties would share information and
concerns.191 This would ensure that ex parte discussions do not deviate from
predetermined topics, allow counsel on both sides to be generally informed
of discussion topics, and help to protect a patient’s information. It would also
help parties anticipate any concerns about ex parte interviews at the beginning
of discovery and better plan their litigation strategy.
The conference provision would squarely comply with both the Loudon
and Youngs rules. Loudon recognized the importance of protecting physicianpatient confidentiality; this provision soundly furthers that public policy goal
by affording patients procedural mechanisms to protect their privacy.
Furthermore, the provision would help litigants and judges clarify the
ambiguous “facts of the alleged negligent incident”192 language that Youngs
added—since the parties will be able to discuss what information is relevant
to the underlying claims. Trial court judges are certainly well-positioned to
help enforce these provisions on a case-by-case basis.
188. See Youngs v. Peacehealth, 179 Wash. 2d 645, 653, 316 P.3d 1035, 1040 (2014) (emphasis
omitted).
189. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text.
190. WASH. R. CIV. P. § 26(f).
191. See, e.g., Stempler v. Speidell, 495 A.2d 857, 864–65 (N.J. 1985) (discussing court
supervision of ex parte interviews).
192. Youngs v. Peacehealth, 179 Wash. 2d 645, 664, 316 P.3d 1035, 1045 (2014) (emphasis
omitted).
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Lastly, the conference could likely enable the parties to meet and share
pertinent, non-privileged information under RCW 5.60.060(4). Sharing
such information would reduce the need for parties to later engage in ex
parte communications.
2.

Second, the Parties Should be Required to Submit a Motion for Ex
Parte Communications

Assuming that the parties still want to engage in ex parte
communication following the discovery conference, the parties should
then be required to submit a motion to the trial court.
When defendants seek to engage in ex parte interviews with plaintiff’s
nonparty treating physician, it is critical that trial judges inquire into the
defendant’s purpose for conducting interviews. Given the risks discussed
above, at least some speculation is warranted when defendants seek to
exercise this discovery strategy. But courts should also be cognizant that ex
parte interviews are valuable tools. Therefore, litigants seeking to interview
nonparty treating physicians should be required to submit a motion to the
court that explains the reasons why the ex parte interview is necessary.
This motion would fit soundly within the existing legal framework.
Recall that the patient, by filing a suit alleging personal injuries, waives
the privilege of information, “which was necessary to enable . . . [the
physician] to prescribe or act for the patient.”193 Therefore,
RCW 5.60.060(4) defines the scope of medical information that the
opposing party may attempt to discover. This information can be in the
form of physician testimony or medical records, including the patient’s
chart. Youngs then allows ex parte interviews with “a physician who has
direct knowledge” of the event but constrains the interview’s scope to the
“facts . . . [that concern] the alleged negligent incident.”194 Filing a
motion would therefore be an intermediate step within this framework.
A possible counter argument is that adding such a requirement would
conflict with the Youngs holding. But that is incorrect. Instead, this motion
uses Youngs as a baseline, but adds several refinements to the existing
rule; therefore, it does not change Youngs’s substantive requirements, but
merely adds a layer of procedural clarification.
The next step is to outline who can file the motion, when it should be
filed, and what it should say. The party seeking to engage in ex parte
interviews with a patient’s nonparty treating physician should be required
to submit a motion that explains why normal discovery channels are
insufficient. This includes both plaintiffs and defendants—although
193. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(4) (201); see also supra note 54 and accompanying text.
194. See Youngs, 179 Wash. 2d at 664, 316 P.3d at 1045 (emphasis omitted).
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additional requirements are suggested for corporate defendants in order to
comply with the Youngs holding.
The motion should be submitted following the mandatory discovery
conference—although any specific timeframes seem largely unimportant
here. Finally, the moving party should be required to show these five
elements in order for the trial court judge to grant the motion:
(1) The party must identify the nonparty physician(s) with whom
it seeks to engage in ex parte communications;
(2) The party must submit proof that the physicians provided
medical treatment to the patient;
(3) If the party is a corporate defendant, it must show that the
proposed communication meets the general prerequisite to
attorney-client privilege as stated in Washington law. This
element does not apply to non-incorporated defendants;
(4) The party must identify the nature and scope of the patients’
medical information it seeks to gain from the interview and
explain how that information relates to the alleged negligent
accident; and
(5) The party must show that the ex parte interview is the
preferred method to gain the information instead of formal
discovery methods because the formal channels are unduly
burdensome, costly, or otherwise ineffective.
Upon a showing of these elements, the trial court judge should permit the party
to engage in ex parte communication with the nonparty treating physician.
CONCLUSION
Physician-patient privilege is a cornerstone of the healthcare system
and must be protected. Concerns about breaches of this privilege are
exacerbated when attorneys seek to communicate with physicians ex
parte. The Washington State Supreme Court allows corporate defendants
to engage in such communications under the veil of attorney-client
privilege. However, the scope of assessing what exactly the physician may
discuss is ambiguous, which exposes physicians to liability for
inadvertently disclosing patient information and affording unfair litigation
advantages to defendants. Any solution to the issues posed in the Youngs
holding should rely on the expertise of superior court judges and allow for
a flexible, case-by-case method of resolution. Amendments to the
Washington Civil Rules do just that. These proposed modifications could
help ensure that discovery in medical malpractice cases proceeds
smoothly—and equitably balances the interests of the parties involved.

